Factors in the Design
of Experimental Graphic Displays
William A. Kealy
University of South Florida
A couple months ago, when I was invited to share some of my recent research
with the IT Forum, my thought was to present the findings of research on
graphic organizers (GO) being prepared for journal submission. In a nutshell,
the two experiments show that arranging the elements of a GO according to
the gestalt principle of proximity and their real-world spatial relationship
results in significantly better recall—with respectively greater accuracy
and speed—of accompanying text information. Along with an earlier article
on GOs (Kealy, 2000), I use three experiments to argue that these displays,
and perhaps all instructional graphics in general, should be designed with
three factors in mind that have psychological consequences: perceptual,
cognitive, and sociocultural or constructionist.
Instead of my original idea for the Forum, I’m going to use this opportunity
to “step out on a limb” and present a bolder proposition: some research employing
graphic materials may be confounded due to a failure to consider the three
factors previously mentioned. I won’t venture a guess as to how much research
has been conducted with questionable findings because of the quality of the
experimental treatments used, but it’s nevertheless a possibility worth exploring.
Apart from the standard recommendations one receives in Research 101 to norm
one’s material (we always do that, right?), there doesn’t seem to be much
said about how one can undermine or strengthen a study by virtue of how its
graphic treatments are designed.
There are several reasons why graphic-based experimental treatments are especially
vulnerable to being poorly implemented. One is that there are much fewer
standards for controlling for extraneous variables with graphics compared
to text. In designing an experimental text it’s common to create alternate
versions that put target information in different locations as a way of controlling
for order effects. What corresponding standards and measures exist for the
development of graphical experimental treatments?
A second reason for why it may be harder to create valid experimental graphics
is that people have less skill in creating visuals than prose. Even when
the graphic task is fairly easy, such as making a fictitious map, novices
might lack the domain specific knowledge needed to produce a suitable experimental
treatment. Ormrod, Ormrod, and Wagner (1988), for example, criticized the
maps many researchers use in experiments on the grounds of their implausibility.
Singling out the map used by Thorndyke and Stasz (1980) to make their point,
they observed:
[The map] showed roads and railways that untypically followed mutually
exclusive routes, contained road and rail network junctions that were unexpectedly
mutually exclusive, and lacked any indication of a normal settlement hierarchy.
(p. 425)
In this case, the deficiency of the map in question was not due to the researchers’
lack of artistic ability but rather because they lacked a cartographer’s
sensitivity for how the arrangement of a map’s elements influences its interpretation.
Employing professional artists or draftsmen to create experimental graphic
treatments doesn’t guarantee that subjects will interpret the materials as
researchers expect. A case in point is the urban map used by Kulhavy, Schwartz
and Shaha (1982) that displays six city blocks as a grid containing 36 pictorially
represented, or mimetic, features. Here, the researchers hired a professional
artist to carefully render each feature as a line drawing. As an additional
precautionary measure, three judges evaluated the images to ensure that each
was visually distinct and accurate in its portrayal. Yet, as Figure 1 shows,
the resulting display bears little resemblance to a typical street map. In
Experiment 2 of the study, where the street grid appeared on all treatment
maps, none of the anticipated differences in feature recall resulted between
displays that sequentially presented features by category, by spatial distribution,
or randomly. Do you think there might be different results obtained using
a redesigned version of the map in Figure 1?
Figure 1. Map used in the Kulhavy, Schwartz, and Shaha
(1982) study and its redsign to the right
A third reason why graphics materials are harder to control in an experimental
setting is that, as a symbol system, they have a greater capacity for repletness
(Salomon, 1994) than text. This means that subtle changes to the surface
features of a graphic have a much greater impact on how it is interpreted
compared to a text. To use an extreme example, changing the color of the
sky in a photograph may render the scene more pastoral or ominous whereas
changing the font used in a prose passage does little to alter its meaning.
Consequently, graphic media are inherently more vulnerable to misinterpretation
than the written word.
Finally, I think graphic treatments have a greater probability of having
a confounding influence in research simply because they have a shorter history
of use in psychological research than verbal materials. We were well into
the cognitive era, for instance, before it became acceptable to speak of
imaginal coding as a process distinctly separate from linguistic encoding.
With the emergence and acceptance of dual coding theory (Paivio, 1971, 1986),
the past decade has seen a remarkable increase in the amount of research
that incorporates graphic materials such as maps (Kulhavy, Stock, & Kealy,
1993), diagrams (Winn, 1988, 1993), graphic organizers (Robinson & Schraw,
1994), and multimedia (Mayer & Sims, 1994).
Types of Threats Graphics Can Pose for Researchers
One way that graphics potentially undermine research outcomes is when they
do a poor job of activating the particular psychological state being investigated.
For instance, suppose a researcher is studying the effect that prior knowledge
for a map has on its effectiveness as an aid for learning a related text.
Two maps are created for the study, a U.S. map and one that’s fictitious
representing the “no prior knowledge” condition. If the latter map unintentionally
reminds subjects of a particular country, can one really claim that the variable
of prior knowledge has been examined? In most cases, however, researchers
probably are aware of this sort of problem and take appropriate measures
in norming the materials.
In this paper, by contrast, I discuss a different category of flaws in experimental
treatments that I believe can easily be hidden from a researcher’s scrutiny.
Within this class of threats to graphic treatments, the elements, rules,
and field of reference of a graphic-based symbol system unintentionally impinge
on how a representation of the system is interpreted. Unlike the earlier
example, these influences are not the result of faulty employment of the
graphics system per se. Instead, they exist as artifacts of the system itself.
Such artifacts, I contend, are products of the interaction between the cognitive
capacities (Kozma, 1991) of a symbol system and the stages involved in mentally
processing the various aspects of the system. For the sake of clarity, I’ll
mention symbol systems and mental processing first and then move on to what
I mean by system artifacts.
A symbol system consists of symbolic elements, symbolic rules, and a field
of reference or context of use within which elements and rules manifest themselves
in practical ways (Salomon, 1994). Within the context of cartography, for
example, there are symbolic elements such as map features and symbolic rules
that guide how these elements should be organized; features on maps are spatially
arranged to correspond with how they would occur in the world being represented.
Personally, I find that the idea of symbol systems offers an interesting
way of considering the graphic variables that influence learning (Kealy,
1996). To illustrate what I mean, here are three experiments dealing with
maps from the point of view of the display as a symbol system:
Component
|
Symbolic Elements
|
Symbolic Rules
|
Symbolic Field of Reference
|
Research variable
|
Discrimination of map features as mimetic
pictures or verbal labels
|
Configuration of map features into a
list or into a spatially dispersed array.
|
Representation of a display in either
a map-like or diagram-like interpretive context.
|
Experiment
|
Griffin & Robinson, 2000
|
Abel & Kulhavy, 1989
|
Kealy & Webb (1995)
|
These three aspects of a symbol system come into play when a person uses
a representative display to get information for accomplishing a given task.
Since, in most cases, even static instructional displays are accompanied
by verbal material, it’s legitimate to call such graphics “multimedia” according
to part of Mayer’s (2001) definition. When learners are presented with a
semantically related set of graphics and text, they typically first attend
to critical parts of the visual and verbal information. Learners next try
to form mental models of the two forms of information for encoding. In the
last stage of this three-stage encoding process (Mayer, 1999), learners try
to integrate these imaginal and linguistic mental models for long-term storage.
Perceptual Artifacts. At last I come to the artifacts of symbols systems
that present themselves as extraneous variables when research subjects examine
graphics displays. I think these artifacts fall into three categories: perceptual,
cognitive, and constructionist. Perceptual artifacts are typically
encountered early in processing (i.e., the first stage of Mayer’s [1999]
model) and can involve either low-level or high-level perception—a distinction
I won’t get into now for the sake of brevity.
One example of how perception influences a display might be the tendency
for subjects to process the whole of a display before its parts or vice versa.
Many factors influence whether the whole or part is attended to first such
as the viewing angle and the number of objects being viewed. Nevertheless,
the point is that if the outcome of an experiment relies on mental processing,
and processing effectiveness relies on attention allocation, and attention
is affected by whether one sees the whole before the parts—well, you see
what I mean. If a display isn’t created to perceptually support the location
of target information, it will probably hinder subjects’ learning performance
without the researcher knowing it, because perception wasn’t the independent
variable of the study.
I first became aware of the possibility of unplanned perceptual influences
on experimental treatments while reading the outcome of Robinson and Schraw’s
(1994) study on graphic organizers (GO). One of the treatments in the study
consisted of a GO that presented subjects with a matrix of fish characteristics
with three levels of water depth presented across the top as major headings
and categories of fish name, diet, size, socialization, and color along the
left-hand edge as row labels. For each water depth, there were two columns,
resulting in six fish types and corresponding characteristics (e.g., six
colors, six sizes).
In looking at the experimental display, I was struck by the fact that the
elements of the matrix were arranged equidistant to one another. If, by contrast,
the GO experimental display used the gestalt principle of proximity to signal
membership to a major column category of water depth, it seemed an entirely
different result might have occurred. Our research team redesigned the original
GO (Robinson & Schraw, 1994), slightly rearranging the display’s elements
so that the matrix formed suggested three columns consisting of two columns
each. A comparison of the original GO with the redesigned display indicated
the latter yielded significantly better comparative judgments by subjects
on the information contained in the GO.
Cognitive Artifacts. Cognitive influences of a symbol system are those
that affect learners’ ability to effectively form linguistic or imaginal
mental models of the information at hand. Hence, cognitive artifacts of the
symbol system are associated with the second, or model-building, phase of
Mayer’s (1999) model. Aspects of information processing, such as the limits
of working memory, task expectations, and availability of relevant prior
knowledge, are especially important during model-building. So, this leads
me to ask, in what ways can graphic experimental treatments inadvertently
color how subjects form mental representations? From the standpoint of symbolic
elements, suppose map features are discriminated between subjects so that
one version activates prior knowledge more than the other. Assume also that,
while prior knowledge correlates with performance on the dependent measure,
prior knowledge isn’t the psychological construct under investigation.
In this hypothetical situation, do you think the graphic treatments might
portray an intervening variable that a researcher wouldn’t be aware of?
The potential influence of cognitive artifacts is reflected in an experiment
I ran a few years ago (Kealy, 2000) using the GO and accompanying text from
the Robinson and Schraw (1994) study. I observed that GO used by the two
researchers was designed so that “depth” served as the major category for
semantically organizing the display. Meanwhile, the accompanying text was
semantically organized according to the socialization of fish (school, small
group, or solitary); socialization was the topic sentence for every paragraph
in the text. Because the semantic structure of the graphic treatment was
incongruous with its accompanying text, it seemed likely that such a discrepancy
would have an influence on what subjects remembered from the information
presented to them. A redesigned GO, with socialization as the major heading,
produced better recall for information dealing with the socialization behavior
of fish than the original GO.
Constructionist Artifacts. I use the term constructionist to define
the last category of unintended influences graphics treatment can have on
experimental results. I prefer constructionism over constructivism as a term
to describe this category of intervening variables because the former implies
a kind of knowledge-building that’s more serendipitous and less self-conscious
than the latter (Papert & Harel, 1991; see Cole & Wertsch, 1996 and
Wink, 2002 for a fuller discussion of this distinction). Further, my use
of constructionist is with a sociocultural context in mind. Specifically,
constructionist artifacts of graphics are preconscious responses rooted in
the cultural conventions of using a particular symbol system.
To illustrate, in my graduate courses at USF, the preconscious influence
of constructionist artifacts on learning, I present a relevant study by Winn
and Holliday (1982). In the experiment, subjects studied a diagram on dinosaur
evolution (See Figure 2) in which creatures faced to the right and the sequence
of evolution proceeded from left-to-right. A second group received the same
diagram but with dinosaurs facing left and evolving right-to-left. I ask
my classes to speculate what group showed significantly better recall performance
for the related information and why the result occurred. What outcome would
you guess? Virtually everyone picks the former group and speculates the reason
for the performance difference is that both groups “map” their experience
of reading words (i.e., from left to right) on the symbol system peculiar
to diagrams. Consequently, the latter group is at a disadvantage due to the
incongruity between the verbal and diagrammatic symbol systems without
ever being aware that something was wrong with their diagram. As an aside,
some students invariably ask if the study has even been replicated in, say,
China or Israel (an interesting question—does anyone out there know?).
Figure 2. Dinosaur diagrams used in the Winn and Holliday
(1982) study
The potential threats that cultural conventions of symbol systems pose for
graphics treatments are especially insidious because, like water to a fish,
they are parts of the environment that escape the awareness of both experimenters
and subjects alike. This hidden aspect of graphic treatments was demonstrated
in a study we conducted that presented subjects with two types of graphic
organizers. One GO (the display used in the first experiment that followed
the principle of proximity in arranging array elements) had three levels
of the category “depth” arranged across the top of the chart. A second GO
had the depth category arranged vertically along the left side so that levels
became progressively deeper from top to bottom—as they would appear in nature.
Although accuracy of subjects’ ability to make comparative judgments on fish
characteristics was the same for both groups, the participants with a naturally
congruous GO made their responses significantly faster.
Research with Graphic Displays: A Call to Action
Despite the cautions presented here on the many ways graphic treatments can
introduce intervening variables into research, I believe that empirical studies
remain a viable method for improving the effectiveness of instructional media.
First, there’s still an important place for well-run scientific experiments
in educational research (Mayer, 2000)—and for understanding how learners
can better use instructional graphics and how we, the designers of these
adjuncts, can make them better.
Second, there is much we’re only now beginning to understand about the role
of instructional media within learning environments. Most instructional technologists
today would, I think, agree that learning is the result of a complex mix
between the task, the learner, and the nature of the learning material involved.
Over the past few decades our awareness of how people learn has matured to
the point where we’re able to start making useful prescriptions for the design
and delivery of instructional media.
Third, technological strides achieved in just the last few years, such as
the increase in available memory and bandwidth, have profoundly altered the
nature of instructional media both in who produces it and in its power to
communicate. Developments like zoomable-user interfaces and interactive 3-D
models invite researchers to revisit Kozma’s (1991) notion about the “cognitive
capacities” of media.
Finally, authoring software such as SuperLab, E-Prime, and MediaLab give
researchers the tools for designing computer-based experimental treatments
that can gather data previously very difficult or impossible to obtain. Using
Authorware, for instance, our research team has been able to create experimental
treatments that accurately determine when and for how long learners access
adjunct graphic displays in a computer-based instruction (Kealy et al, in
press). This capability offers exciting possibilities for determining, for
instance, the types of task expectancies and learning contexts that motivate
the study of some graphic displays more than others.
These possibilities, however, can’t be fully realized unless researchers
exercise care in designing and developing the graphic treatments they use
in experiments. Whatever the technology employed, we would ideally want graphic
treatments to be designed so that they effectively tap the psychological
construct being investigated. What should we expect of graphics used in research?
Perhaps one desirable quality of experimental displays is that they don’t
inadvertently misdirect subjects’ attention either by failure to activate
perception (e.g., by portraying symbolic elements too faintly to be seen)
or by accidentally cueing visual interest for irrelevant details.
Might it also be a good idea for experimental displays to adhere to basic
rules of good graphic design (e.g., simplicity, balance, unity) and, when
presented in concert with text or audio narration, that they conform to the
design recommendations gained from research on learning with dually-encoded
multimedia? Should researchers have greater awareness of the symbolic rules
pertaining to the instructional medium that they are using in a study? For
instance, could the vertical stacking of graphic elements unintentionally
suggest a hierarchical relationship or, if the same items were placed side
by side, would the arrangement suggest a state of causality (Winn & Solomon
1993)? To what degree do instructional technologists need to sharpen their
awareness of the preconscious knowledge that’s socially constructed in the
daily use of the media under examination?
What else…your thoughts?
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ITFORUM PAPER #69 - Factors
in the Design of Experimental Graphic Displays by William A. Kealy. Posted
on ITFORUM on March 28, 2003. The author retains all copyrights of this
work. Used on ITFORUM by permission of the author. Visit the ITFORUM WWW
Home Page at http://it.coe.uga.edu/itforum/